These days many have started believing that there is no
elusive elixir to the India –Pak relations. A new government on either side initially
begins with a sense of optimism, bonhomie and handshakes, and it doesn’t take a
while, to descent into usual rhetoric and antagonism.
Obviously Kashmir tops the disputes between Pakistan and
India even though Sir Creek, Siachen and sharing of water have slowly taken
various positions in due course. It is believed that President Mushraff and
Vajpayee were closer to agreement on Kashmir based on four point agenda
outlined by the former. But the current Pakistan administration has distanced
from those, which they feel, have diluted Pakistan’s traditional stand which
considers Kashmir as a disputed territory.
India wants status quo in Kashmir and intend to convert the line
of control into a de facto border. Apart from few concessions, like soft border
which allows people and movement of goods from both sides, India has nothing
much to offer on Kashmir. And India used “composite dialogue” as a pretext to
counter Pakistan‘s single point focus on Kashmir dispute during negotiations.
Not surprisingly Pakistan and its military institutions always wanted to alter
this “status quo” and used limited low intensity conflict (read terrorism)
against India. The scale of conflict which changed from attacking few army men
in Kashmir to staging large scaled attack on Mumbai, are ways to highlight that
India will pay its price unless it settles the issues with Pakistan.
Pakistan, after General Zia came to power, followed a
process of “Islamization” which gave sufficient base to recruit jihadi elements.
With the steady supply of military hardware and cash from west for Afghan war, Pakistan’s
spy masters and establishment ran a successful enterprise by running a “jihadi”
network. Bolstered by their success in overthrowing two regimes in Afghanistan,
“jihad” was extended to Kashmir, may be in a way to settle scores with India
over its covert role in the division of Pakistan. Though it created frustration
and anger from time to time for India, their strategy of limited conflict in
Kashmir through “jihadis” didn’t capture mainstream attention in India for a
long time. But Pakistan was successful in extending this conflict to other
parts of India by recruiting some home grown groups and targeted its fists
against some of India’s important centers of power and commerce.
There is no doubt that this low intensity conflict posed a
difficult challenge for India, which always had a considerable lead in
conventional war machines. India tried to respond to high profile ones, like
one on the Parliament by assembling its massive army on the border to threaten
Pakistan, though a conventional war with a nuclear state wasn’t an option. In
fact Indian security establishment weighted many options and considered
military doctrines like “Cold Start” for army to launch limited and time bound operation. But it is almost clear that India lacked technology,
logistics and field intelligence to wage a limited conflict, more importantly there
is a clear absence of “political will” also. But on strategic and diplomatic
front, India has been building closer relations with Afghanistan and opened
four consulates there with an aim to open a new front against Pakistan.
Post 9/11, Pakistan
had to yield to US led multilateral force who launched attack on the same group
they created and supported. Even though Pakistan promised support to US led
invasion, they maintained tactical support and gave sanctuary to many groups
and individuals whom US led forces were hunting. In fact this “double game” worked
very well for them till some jihadi groups went berserk and started hurting
their own interests when some of them were targeted under pressure. Moreover Pakistan‘s
military and intelligence agencies which is almost a parallel state on its own,
have started using these groups against their own detractors and democratic
leaders who acted without their blessings. But in recent times, there is a general
feeling slowly emerging in Pakistan, that these jihadi groups are becoming a dangerous
liability than a strategic asset. In truth, there is still considerable “jihadi
firepower” available with Pakistan which is controlled by their own
intelligence agencies.
For India, there are no visible signboards between nuclear
armed Pakistan and any viable solution on Kashmir. Pakistan will continue to
fight this “limited” and protracted war over Kashmir until India accedes to major
concessions on Kashmir or it builds necessary capabilities to wage a limited
conflict. Diplomacy and negotiations can succeed when both sides believe that they
have a cost to pay for any aggression. Right now for Pakistan, this war is
cheap.
